Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for E.M. Cioran, Friedrich Schleiermacher and George Berkeley

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136 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
So-called wisdom is just pondering things instead of acting [Cioran]
Wisdom is just the last gasp of a dying civilization [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 1. History of Ideas
The history of ideas (and deeds) occurs in a meaningless environment [Cioran]
Intelligence only fully flourishes at the end of a historical period [Cioran]
Ideas are neutral, but people fill them with passion and weakness [Cioran]
A nation gives expression to its sum of values, and is then exhausted [Cioran]
Some thinkers would have been just as dynamic, no matter when they had lived [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
I abandoned philosophy because it didn't acknowledge melancholy and human weakness [Cioran]
Originality in philosophy is just the invention of terms [Cioran]
The mind is superficial, only concerned with the arrangement of events, not their significance [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is a universalisation of physical anguish [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Great systems of philosophy are just brilliant tautologies [Cioran]
Systems are the worst despotism, in philosophy and in life [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
An interpreter of a text, because of wider knowledge, can understand it better than its author [Schleiermacher, by Mautner]
Unity emerges from understanding particulars, so understanding is prior to seeing unity [Schleiermacher]
A text explained ceases to be a text [Cioran]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
No great idea ever emerged from a dialogue [Cioran]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Truth is just an error insufficiently experienced [Cioran]
Eventually every 'truth' is guaranteed by the police [Cioran]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Negation doesn't arise from reasoning, but from deep instincts [Cioran]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
An axiom has no more authority than a frenzy [Cioran]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Infinitesimals are ghosts of departed quantities [Berkeley]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
The word 'being' is very tempting, but in fact means nothing at all [Cioran]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
People who really believe anti-realism don't bother to prove it [Cioran]
Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley]
No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley]
There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Convictions are failures to study anything thoroughly [Cioran]
Opinions are fine, but having convictions means something has gone wrong [Cioran]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley]
Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley]
Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer]
Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley]
When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley]
'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley]
For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling]
Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley]
There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley]
I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley]
There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley]
Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley]
The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley]
Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley]
Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley]
A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley]
The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley]
'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley]
Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley]
Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley]
Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley]
Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Our instincts had to be blunted and diminished, to make way for consciousness! [Cioran]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley]
I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
If people always acted without words we would take them for robots [Cioran]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
We use concepts to master our fears; saying 'death' releases us from confronting it [Cioran]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
If only we could write like a reptile, of endless sensations and no concepts! [Cioran]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
Concepts are only analytic once the predicate is absorbed into the subject [Schleiermacher]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
I want to suppress in myself the normal reasons people have for action [Cioran]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We could only be responsible if we had consented before birth to who we are [Cioran]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
We morally dissolve if we spend time with excessive beauty [Cioran]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
At a civilisation's peak values are all that matters, and people unconsciously live by them [Cioran]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Values don't accumulate; they are ruthlessly replaced [Cioran]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Lovers are hateful, apart from their hovering awareness of death [Cioran]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
To live authentically, we must see that philosophy is totally useless [Cioran]
Man is never himself; he always aims at less than life, or more than life [Cioran]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Evidence suggests that humans do not have a purpose [Cioran]
The pointlessness of our motives and irrelevance of our gestures reveals our vacuity [Cioran]
The universe is dirty and fragile, as if a scandal in nothingness had produced its matter [Cioran]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Unlike other creatures, mankind seems lost in nature [Cioran]
We can only live because our imagination and memory are poor [Cioran]
Life is now more dreaded than death [Cioran]
In anxiety people cling to what reinforces it, because it is a deep need [Cioran]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
No one is brave enough to say they don't want to do anything; we despise such a view [Cioran]
Fear cures boredom, because it is stronger [Cioran]
You are stuck in the past if you don't know boredom [Cioran]
If you lack beliefs, boredom is your martyrdom [Cioran]
History is the bloody rejection of boredom [Cioran]
It is better to watch the hours pass, than trying to fill them [Cioran]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / b. Natural authority
It is pointless to refuse or accept the social order; we must endure it like the weather [Cioran]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
Opportunists can save a nation, and heroes can ruin it [Cioran]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The ideal is to impose a religion by force, and then live in doubt about its beliefs [Cioran]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
Despite endless suggestions, no one has found a goal for history [Cioran]
History is wonderfully devoid of meaning [Cioran]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Suicide is pointless, because it always comes too late [Cioran]
No one has ever found a good argument against suicide [Cioran]
Religions see suicide as insubordination [Cioran]
If you have not contemplated suicide, you are a miserable worm [Cioran]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
We all need sexual secrets! [Cioran]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley]
There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
Why is God so boring, and why does God resemble humanity so little? [Cioran]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 2. Taoism
As the perfect wisdom of detachment, philosophy offers no rivals to Taoism [Cioran]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
When man abandons religion, he then follows new fake gods and mythologies [Cioran]
A religion needs to motivate killings, and cannot tolerate rivals [Cioran]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
The first man obviously found paradise unendurable [Cioran]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / e. Hell
Circles of hell are ridiculous; all that matters is to be there [Cioran]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley]